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COURT REPORTS
FEDERAL COURTS
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURTS
SECOND CIRCUIT
June v. Town of Westfield, 370 F.3d 255 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding the
maintenance exemption to the Clean Water Act applied to an embankment supporting a road for transit by motor vehicles, and road
repairs of this nature, once completed, did not constitute a discharge
for the purposes of an ongoing violation of the Clean Water Act and
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act).
Due to mass erosion, a portion of Mt. Baldy Road in the Town of
Westfield, New York ("Town") was in danger of collapse. In 1997 and
1998, to shore up the embankment and alleviate this problem, the
Town deposited dirt, gravel, sand, rocks, and cement in the area. This
process resulted in an expansion of the embankment, as well as the
partial filling of a gully containing water located directly below the embankment. Michael June brought a private citizen suit alleging the
Town violated the Clean Water Act ("CWA") by: (1) discharging solid
waste consisting of fill material into waters of the United States without
a permit, and (2) discharging storm waters associated with industrial
activity from a "point source" into navigable waters without a permit.
The first charge related to the partial filling of the gully. The second
charge related to the possible storm water runoff that could consist of
the materials deposited by the Town to fix the embankment. June also
alleged the Town violated the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
("RCRA") by engaging in the open dumping of solid waste. He argued
the dirt, gravel, sand, rocks, and cement deposited by the Town constituted solid waste for purposes of the RCRA. The United States District
Court for the Western District of New York granted summary judgment
for the Town on all issues, concluding that the actions of the Town fell
within the section 1344(f) maintenance exemption of the CWA, and
that June failed to show an ongoing violation of either the CWA or the
RCRA. June appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit.
June argued on appeal that the maintenance exemption to the
CWA did not apply, because no pre-existing structure upon which the
Town could perform maintenance existed, and the Town's actions,
absent a pre-existing structure, constituted ongoing violations of both
the CWA and the RCRA. The maintenance exemption allows for the
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completion of maintenance of transportation structures without first
obtaining a permit. Precedent demonstrated the narrow construction
of this exemption with the apparent purpose of allowing routine government maintenance of transportation, public water-supply, and similar facilities without the cost, use of time, and consequent danger to
people and facilities that may occur if a permit was required. The
court concluded the Town's actions fell within the maintenance exemption, construing an embankment that supported a road for transit
by motor vehicles as a "transportation structure." The court further
noted that "maintenance," under this exemption, did not include any
modification that changed the character, scope, or size of the original
fill design. However, the court did not rule on this issue since June did
not raise it or discuss the federal regulation supporting it either in the
district court or on appeal. The court, thus, affirmed the district
court's grant of summary judgment on June's CWA claims because
June only challenged whether the Town qualified for the maintenance
exemption, and the court found that it did.
Finally, in regards to the RCRA claim that the Town engaged in the
dumping of solid waste, the court also granted summary judgment in
favor of the Town. The court relied on S. Rd. Assocs. v. Chesapeake Bay
Found., Inc. to conclude the RCRA prohibited the act of introducing
substances that caused "exceedances," but did not prohibit the actual
pollution of the toxic substance in the environment. The court also
determined a "historical act" did not support a claim under the RCRA.
The court held June's allegations were "historical acts," as he failed to
show the Town was continuing to introduce substances that made the
exceedances worse at the time June filed his lawsuit.
Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Town on all issues.
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SIXTH CIRCUIT
Ailor v. City of Maynardville, 368 F.3d 587 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding
that a citizen suit under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,
and the Clean Water Act is moot if previous enforcement actions
remedied the alleged injuries).
The City of Maynardville ("City") owned and operated a sewage
treatment plant on Bull Run Creek in Tennessee.
Betty Lynch
("Lynch") and Harry Ailor ("Ailor") both owned land along the creek
downstream from the plant. Between January 1991 and December
1992, the plant repeatedly violated its National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System ("NPDES") permit due to overflows and discharges
of raw sewage and other pollutants into Bull Run Creek, inducing the
Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation ("TDEC") to
issue an Order and Assessment in November 1993 against the City.

